

! THE *Nation* January 31, 1942

Our Debt to the Dutch

The Story of Japan's Secret Demands

BY HALLETT ABEND

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WPB, Alias SPAB

BY I. F. STONE

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Why Argentina Balked

BY HUGO FERNANDEZ ARTUCIO

✱

Davies's "Mission to Moscow"

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The Shape of Things

"DERELICTION OF DUTY" ON THE PART OF Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short has been found to be the main cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster by the President's investigating commission headed by Justice Roberts. This verdict is amply sustained in the commission's detailed and clear report. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short received specific warnings of the possibility of a surprise Japanese air attack in early 1941, about the time they took up their commands, and were then instructed to prepare plans to meet such an attempt. Exercises based on those plans were frequently carried out last year, and had they been put into operation as the diplomatic crisis thickened in November, the Japanese raid would have been either impossible or largely ineffective. But neither of the responsible commanders considered that there was serious danger of an air attack even after receiving very urgent warnings of probable war in late November. General Short, who was primarily responsible for the defense of the islands, decided that the situation would be met by ordering "Alert No. 1," which provided for special precautions against sabotage. Messages subsequently received from the War Department seemed to him to indicate that this step satisfied the requirements of the emergency. Actually these precautions contributed to the effectiveness of the Japanese bombers since, for protection against saboteurs, grounded planes were concentrated instead of dispersed. The most amazing failure of the army and navy commanders in Hawaii was that after the warning received on November 27 they held no consultation on what action should be taken, while each assumed without further inquiry that the other was carrying out necessary precautions. This fact indicates an almost unbelievable irresponsibility. It also emphasizes the absolute necessity of unified supreme command in the defense of such a position as Hawaii.

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THE ROBERTS COMMISSION HAS ABSOLVED Secretary Hull of all blame for the Pearl Harbor surprise, declaring that he kept the War and Navy departments fully advised of the course of his negotiations with the Japanese envoys. It seems to us, however, that the report

justifies the conclusion that some indirect blame attaches to the State Department. For instance, in various instructions sent from Washington to the commanders at Hawaii great stress was laid on secrecy, with a view to avoiding provocation and preventing complications in a tense situation. This was clearly a reflection of the State Department's belief that the Japanese wouldn't bite if stroked the right way. We can now see that the one thing which might have checked the Japanese was open provocative action that would have interfered with the surprise on which their whole strategy turned. The commission comments on the completeness of the Japanese organization of espionage, which was carried on through the consulates, and points out that efforts to combat it were hindered "because, the United States being at peace with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the contents of messages." Here again the State Department's insistence on treating Axis agents as gentlemanly diplomats entitled to all the nice courtesies of protocol tied the hands of our intelligence officers. Although the Japanese and other Axis governments constantly violated the privileges of our diplomats, even to the extent of placing microphones in their offices, the State Department would never sanction the use of such methods. This unrealistic policy in dealing with gangsters must be counted as a contributing factor to the complacency that prevailed at Hawaii.

★

AXIS FORCES STRUCK A NEW SERIES OF powerful blows last week in both the Pacific and the Mediterranean. In a surprise attack the Japanese have succeeded in effecting landings at Rabaul, capital of New Britain, in New Guinea, and on the Solomon Islands north of the Australian mainland. Further landings have been made at Balikpapan in southeastern Borneo and at Kendari in southern Celebes. The landings along the Bismark Archipelago are particularly serious because they threaten the main line of communications between the United States and the present Far Eastern war zones. It seems difficult to believe, however, that the Japanese can maintain these footholds, thousands of miles from their bases, against a determined counter-offensive. On the Singapore front the situation seems somewhat better stabilized, although new Allied withdrawals are reported. In Burma the British continue to retreat before the Japanese and Thai invaders. Only in the air and on the sea have the United Nations succeeded in scoring any real successes. Over Rangoon British and American airmen are reported to have shot down more than thirty Japanese planes in two days. New aerial reinforcements appear to have aided greatly in strengthening Singapore's defenses. In the Strait of Macassar Allied air and naval forces combined have sunk or damaged eighteen Japanese ships in what is described as the severest blow of the war. The Mediterranean presents the same picture

of reverses on land but success in the air and on the sea. In a surprising counter-offensive made possible, presumably, by a diversion of Allied reinforcements to the Far East, General Rommel has pushed north of Agadabia and is threatening Bengasi. But the Allies have struck back in the air, sinking a 20,000-ton transport and damaging a number of other ships in a large Axis convoy.

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ONLY ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT HAS THE news been unqualifiedly good. The Soviet offensive midway between Moscow and Leningrad which has resulted in the capture of Kholm and Toropetz represents one of the most brilliant tactical maneuvers of the war. As a result of this advance Rzhev, northern anchor of the Nazi winter line, has been cut off and the Russians have reached a position from which they can either strike northward toward the Baltic, threatening the German force besieging Leningrad, or south against Smolensk. The week also has seen the destruction of the powerfully fortified Mozhaish salient, from which the Nazis hoped to launch their spring drive against Moscow. Some Soviet advances have also been reported in the Donetz basin, but details of action on this front have not been released for some time. In the Crimea the German claim to have recaptured Feodosiya would appear to be correct, although it has not been confirmed from Soviet sources. The extent of the Nazi setback in the north has raised speculation as to the effect of the defeat on Germany's plans for a spring offensive. It is evident that the Nazis have not only lost a considerable amount of equipment and supplies which they counted on for the offensive but have been forced to draw upon their reserves of troops and airplanes. But it is too early to hope for a disruption of the German spring program. That will depend on how much longer the Red Army is able to continue its drive.

★

THE PRESIDENT WILL BE CONFRONTED BY a pretty dilemma when the emasculated price-control bill reaches his desk. If he exercises the veto which it richly deserves, the Price Administrator will be left to struggle along with his present limited non-statutory powers until Congress gets around to passing a new measure. That might mean another six months' delay, and there is no guaranty that a more realistic bill would be enacted. On the other hand, if the President signs, the lofty multiple ceilings which the farm bloc has succeeded in imposing will constitute a positive encouragement to inflation. It is true that the bill has been somewhat strengthened in conference. The provisions for licensing businesses as a means of enforcement and for buying, selling, and storing commodities, which were thrown out by the House, were substantially restored by the Senate and have been agreed to by the conferees. Senator O'Mah-

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ney's amendment which would have created a new parity formula tied directly to wage levels has been eliminated. On the other hand, the Bankhead amendment giving the Secretary of Agriculture veto powers over any ceiling fixed on unprocessed farm products remains. The net effect is to permit a rise in farm prices to 110 per cent of parity, or to the average for each crop during the decade 1919 to 1929, or to the market price on October 1 or December 1 last year, whichever of these alternatives is highest. In most cases it is expected that the formula of 110 per cent of parity will determine the ceiling. This can mean a further increase of 37 per cent in wheat, 50 per cent in corn, and almost 100 per cent in rye. If there is a new jump in the cost of living, increases in wages and industrial prices will be inevitable. Leon Henderson is being handed a blunted ax, and the only possible whetstone in sight is the rapid organization of consumers so that their voices may reach the ears of Congress.

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THERE WAS ONCE A VINSON-TRAMMELL ACT which limited profits on arms contracts to 7 per cent of cost when the contract was negotiated and 8 per cent when competitive bidding was used. The act was repealed at the beginning of the arms program after a capital sitdown strike, but the Administration promised an excess-profits tax in its place which would prevent a new crop of war millionaires. Now we have a report by the House Naval Affairs Committee, headed by Representative Vinson, which offers evidence that a good many corporations are making "unconscionable" profits on their arms contracts. Roughly 60 per cent of all completed and uncompleted contracts studied were in the hands of ten companies, of which General Motors was one. Speaking of completed contracts, the committee declares: "The largest percentage of profits in this group was reported by Delco-Remy, Harrison Radiator, Cleveland Diesel Engine, and Fisher Body, all divisions of the General Motors Corporation, which reported profits of \$3,398,487 on \$17,292,685 of contracts, amounting to an average net profit of 24.5 per cent on the cost."

★

IT IS A PITY THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS weakened its report and distracted attention from its figures on business profits by including some entirely irrelevant findings about the assets of labor unions. Since September, 1939, it asserts, net assets of American labor organizations, A. F. L., C. I. O., and independent, have risen from \$72,000,000 to \$82,000,000. This total does not seem very impressive if compared with the earnings of some of our great corporations. But the committee declares: "The tremendous financial gains made by labor organizations present an astounding picture of concentration of wealth, a situation hitherto associated only with industry and finance." We commend Representative

Joseph B. Shannon of Missouri for his courageous and intelligent protest against this strabismic attempt to smear labor and thus soften the committee's strictures against capital.

Ireland and America

IT MAY seem odd at first to some of our readers that *The Nation* should devote an entire supplement to Ireland at this critical moment in world history. But we are confident that this feeling will be quickly dissipated by a reading of the articles in this special number. For many decades the Irish people have looked to the United States for support in their struggle for complete independence. The story of America's assistance to the Irish cause during the dark days between 1916 and 1921 is fully described in the supplement by Suzanne La Follette. During this period no magazine rendered more effective aid than *The Nation* through its publication of the facts of British misrule and its organization of the American Committee of One Hundred.

At a time when Ireland's policies are of vital concern to the people of the United States, it is only fitting, then, that *The Nation* should undertake an examination of the background of those policies. Readers of *The Nation* are prepared to be sympathetic with Eire's desire to exercise full and unqualified sovereignty as an independent nation. They understand why De Valera had no choice at the outbreak of the war except to declare neutrality. But a careful reading of the supplement suggests that the situation has changed sharply with the entry of the United States into the war. De Valera himself said in 1919 that "when America entered the war it made a difference." That statement has not lost its significance with the passage of years.

It is apparent that with the division of the entire world into two camps the maintenance of an impartial neutrality has become increasingly difficult. Because of its strategic position Ireland must either aid the democracies or play Hitler's game. No middle course is open to it. If it continues to play Hitler's game by an unfavorable interpretation of neutrality, it must inevitably forfeit American sympathy and support and take its place, when the war is over, with the anti-democratic nations at the peace table.

Dark though it is, this prospect is not likely to prove decisive with De Valera. Because of his American background he is much more likely to be moved by the realization that a refusal to conclude some arrangement regarding bases endangers not only the future of the British Empire but that of the United States. Perhaps the decisive factor in inducing a change in policy will be the knowledge that thousands of American boys of Irish descent will soon be moving through the subma-

rine-infested waters near the Irish coast. De Valera has repeatedly said that Ireland will go to any length to repay its debt to the United States. Before America's entry into the war he may have had some reservations about the consideration that would be given Eire's post-war claims in the event it supported the Allied cause. But he no longer can have any doubts. For he knows that the United States will not forget those who come to its assistance in its hour of danger.

Everybody Wins but Lewis

JOHN L. LEWIS'S sudden espousal of unity in the labor movement is, if we may slide into Lewis English, the accouplement of an unimpeachable idea with the most impeachable auspices. We have always looked forward to a merger of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor, and it hardly requires a Gallup poll to establish the wide popularity of such a move. Theoretically unity would strengthen labor's bargaining position, would serve the war program by confronting the government with a single and coherent trade-union policy, and would be a blessing to the consumer and the rank-and-file unionist, both of whom have grown weary of the senseless intra-union squabbling that has plagued the country these past six years.

Desirable as it may be in principle, however, unity, like any other worthy objective, has a price beyond which it ceases to be profitable; it may, moreover, be attained by methods and with motives which negate in advance any possible benefits. One may concede, for example, that the unity of Europe is a noble purpose without supporting the efforts of Adolf Hitler in that direction. We do not wish to make too much of this odious comparison, but the plain fact is that a scheme for labor unity worked out by John L. Lewis and William Hutcheson is suspect from the start. The C. I. O.—which may be said to have been born, ironically, out of an "accouplement" between Lewis and Hutcheson that involved a right hook to the Hutcheson jaw—has twice repudiated its first leader: when he indorsed Wendell Willkie in the Presidential campaign of 1940, and when he tried to deliver the labor movement to the isolationists in 1941. Losing caste with many of his most ardent followers, Lewis has steadily become more irresponsible, more vengeful, more embittered. With the collapse of his power in the C. I. O., his bid for the kind of unified labor movement which he has repeatedly denounced in the past must inevitably be viewed as a shrewd but desperate maneuver to regain the throne.

Hutcheson, perhaps the most reactionary and intolerant bureaucrat in the whole labor movement, and Lewis found common political ground in the activities of the America First Committee, and even if we discount altogether the rumors of an isolationist plot we are entitled to look with the greatest misgivings on any plan to unite labor for the war effort which draws its inspiration from two stalwart heroes of that discredited band. A political interpretation of the unity move is further warranted by Lewis's gross failure to consult Philip Murray before proposing the resumption of peace negotiations. Murray, who might have been consulted as president of the C. I. O., as a member of the archaic labor peace committee by whose authority Lewis claims to have acted, or simply as a lifelong friend, has incurred the wrath of his former chief primarily because he is a warm, if critical, supporter of the Administration and its foreign policies.

If unity is a good thing in itself, it may reasonably be asked—and in fact is being asked—why a merger cannot be effected on the initiative of individuals more reliable than Lewis and Hutcheson. President Roosevelt and Philip Murray, it seems to us, have suggested the answer and provided a good alternative, acceptable to the executive councils of both labor bodies. The issue that created the C. I. O. and stimulated it to amazing growth is still present and operative—namely, the issue of industrial unionism versus craft unionism. If either side were disposed to yield all the way, it would simply dissolve and enter the rival organization. That is out of the question. If, however, there were to be a compromise, with some industries consigned to one form of organization and some to the other, it is plain that many existing unions would have to go into the discard. Aside from the principle involved, that is not a prospect that incumbent officials can be expected to relish, and the slow and painful process of working out the details would certainly be marked by such scheming, horse-trading, and generally unlovely power politics that there would be little energy or time left for the problems of war production.

In place of this sudden introduction of chaos, the President's plan calls for a three-man committee from each of the two labor bodies to consult with him on all jurisdictional disputes and on any other matters relating to labor's part in the war effort. With the degree of cooperation that has already been achieved between the two groups, this arrangement promises, at least for the present, most of the advantages of a merger with none of the confusion and bitterness which a wholesale reallocation of jurisdictions would precipitate. It is simply a case of choosing harmony without unity in preference to unity without harmony. Everybody wins but John L. Lewis.

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Unanimity at Any Price

BY FRED A KIRCHWEY

EVERYBODY is happy as the Rio conference disbands. Sumner Welles is profoundly gratified. Acting President Castillo rates the outcome a triumph for Argentine diplomacy. Brazil is pleased at its acrobatic success in serving both as Argentina's advocate and as the stout supporter of hemisphere solidarity. And the Nazis are happy—with good reason. Such universal satisfaction is sufficient comment on the political formula finally accepted by the powers assembled at Rio. To attain unanimity the conference surrendered to the spirit of disunion—personified in the government and representative of Argentina. To achieve some general expression of the will to resist Axis aggression the conference yielded to the one undisguised pro-Axis element in its membership.

The victory of Argentina was summed up in the qualifications imbedded in Article 3 of the agreement:

The American republics, in accordance with the procedure established by their own laws and within the position and circumstances of each country in the actual continental conflict, recommend the rupture of their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, and Italy, since the first of these states has attacked and the other two have declared war on an American country.

This formula has been correctly and promptly interpreted by the Acting President of Argentina as leaving every nation free to adopt the decisions "that its special situation and circumstances counsel."

Now the comfortable attitude toward the outcome at Rio, the attitude adopted by many good and patriotic commentators, can be summed up something like this: "We didn't get all we asked for, of course, but we achieved greater understanding and established the determination of almost the whole hemisphere to stand solidly against Axis aggression. So the conference was a success in spite of certain minor concessions."

This interpretation would be permissible if the meeting just ended had been just another pan-American get-together aimed at closer relations and general understandings about ordinary international affairs. But the conference at Rio was a war conference called to plan for the defense of this hemisphere against implacable enemies with which the United States is already physically engaged. Latin America is even now one of the major battlefields of that war, as Mr. Artucio convincingly points out in his article on another page. Indeed, when Dr. Castillo assumed dictatorial powers under the cloak of a decreed state of siege, he may in effect have signed a Vichy armistice with the enemy, and the "Battle of Argentina" may have been won by the Axis.

By yielding to Argentina's demands at Rio, by allowing a pro-Axis government to write its own reservations into an agreement for hemispheric resistance to the Axis, the other powers gave up more than the substance of the one great issue before them. They solidified the control of the elements in Argentina which were responsible for its recalcitrance and encouraged their counterparts in every other Latin American state.

What would have been lost by sticking firmly to the original clear-cut terms of agreement proposed by Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela? Argentina's representatives would either have signed, and suffered a salutary diplomatic defeat, or they would have refused to sign and found themselves isolated. If Argentina had felt itself forced to join the rest of the hemisphere in declaring clearly for a break with the Axis, the pro-Axis policy of Castillo would have been weakened by its surrender. If it had held out, the democratic forces in the country, admittedly the great majority, might have felt strong enough to oust their present rulers.

That this was perfectly clear to the men in power in Buenos Aires is evident from two revealing dispatches in the *New York Times*. On January 23 Arnaldo Cortesi reported from the Argentine capital that the news of the compromise formula had caused great relief. "It is clear," he said, that Señor Castillo "must be glad at having been relieved of the responsibility of standing alone against the prevalent opinion of the republics of this continent, which might have brought about some reactions of Argentine public opinion. . . . The agreement announced today seems to eliminate the danger of complications of this nature." On the next day he described the visit of the German envoy to the Argentine Foreign Office and said that the Acting Foreign Minister had assured Herr Meynen that Argentina had retained "full liberty of action." "From this reply," he went on, "it is inferred that no change in Argentine-German relations is foreseen, at least for the present."

So the unanimity achieved at so great a price at Rio has permitted the elements that forced the fatal concessions to appear before their own dissatisfied people wearing the laurels of their diplomatic triumph. Thus strengthened, they may well be able to hold on to their power and continue to help the Axis in its war against the hemisphere. And if anyone thinks that a benevolently neutral Argentina is not an important asset to the Axis in America, he has not followed Nazi methods of political warfare. A base of operations is all that is needed to subvert the best efforts of neighboring republics to stamp out their own native fascists and rid themselves of the horde of Axis agents that still infest them. Even the substantial benefits which should flow from the economic agreements reached in the last days of the conference will be partially nullified by the political success of the pro-Axis group.

WPB, *Alias* SPAB

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, January 23

THE operator at the same telephone number says "War Production Board" instead of "Office of Production Management," but one sees the same dollar-a-year faces in the corridors. On Donald M. Nelson's desk is an elaborate memorandum from Merrill C. Meigs, the dollar-a-year Hearstling from Chicago, proving that we cannot build 60,000 planes this year—or half that many. As, indeed, we cannot so long as men like Meigs hold—continue to hold—the same key positions in the arms-program setup despite successive "shake-ups," each of them little more than a rechristening. I mention Meigs only as an example, but he is worth a little attention on his own. He is top man for aircraft production, and has been since the days when they called it the National Defense Advisory Commission. He was Hearst's publisher during the Chicago strike, is an amateur pilot, and as Sidney Hillman once explained to me, he knows the aircraft people personally. Of other qualifications for this crucial post—energy, imagination, drive—none are visible in Meigs. He is not a production man and he will never be caught stepping on an aircraft manufacturer's toes. There are many more like him in WPB, alias SPAB, alias OPM, alias NDAC, and they're still there, despite Nelson's latest reorganization.

If I remember my Anthropology I, certain primitive tribes think a sick man may be saved by changing his name, thereby confusing the evil spirits on his trail. The method has now been tried out again on the arms program. More valuable time—time that means lives—is going to be lost while we slowly wake up to the fact that, as the French say, the more it changes, the more it remains the same. No organization is ever reformed by changing the man at the top or by paper recharting of its bureaus, much less by rebaptism. I'm not going to bother the reader or waste space describing the six new branches into which Nelson has divided the WPB, because I don't think they matter. Just about one month has passed since the last inner reshuffle of this kind. "Calling for a greater degree of industrial mobilization," said the press release, "the Office of Production Management today announced an organization change designed to speed up conversion of civilian industry to war-time production." The details, quite elaborate, have since gone down the drain, but for several days they were the wonder-formula of the Knudsen and Hillman offices. The details of the present rearrangement of internal bureaus will seem as inconsequential a few weeks hence.

They approach nowhere near the heart of the problem.

In this umteenth shake-up the President has made the discredited Knudsen a Lieutenant General and Director of Production for the army. The actual placing of the contracts is still in the hands of the army, and my guess is that this will be no honorary post, and that the greatest single bottleneck of the arms program—the automotive genius who knew the automotive industry couldn't be converted—will be firmly planted in army procurement. At the same time, when Nelson pulled the big silk handkerchief off the big silk hat this week, it was seen that Knudsen's fair-haired boy, W. H. Harrison of A. T. and T., was to remain Director of Production in WPB as in OPM. Knudsen and Harrison, as Nelson unnecessarily explained at press conference, will work together. Now I know of no better illustration of what is wrong with the arms program than the testimony of these two men before the Tolan committee on December 22. Harrison was being questioned by Congressman Sparkman of Alabama, and the "division" referred to in the passage I am about to quote is the Division of Production.

MR. SPARKMAN: Has your division ever made a survey of existing facilities of industry, particularly of the automobile industry, to see what convertible and idle facilities could be used for the production of tanks, airplanes, and other types of equipment?

MR. HARRISON: Only in the sense that we are looking for specific items. We do then contact and discuss the problem with individual manufacturers. . . .

MR. SPARKMAN: You never would be called upon, then, to make a survey that would show you the complete picture as to the convertibility of any particular industry, would you?

MR. HARRISON: Well, up to the present time, sir, we have been taking the individual items and trying to place them, in cooperation with the army and the navy, in those places where it is clear that we would get the quality wanted and in the necessary time, considering, likewise, the price that is involved. But from the standpoint of taking an over-all industry and analyzing and surveying its capacity, no.

A few minutes earlier Robert K. Lamb had asked Knudsen about the methods used to spread work out to smaller business men:

With reference to the small producer, will the procurement officer deal only with prime contracts, so that the subcontractor or small producer will have to come in as a subcontractor for an intermediate subcontractor?

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MR. KNUDSEN: Yes, sir; that is right.

DR. LAMB: In other words, he [the small business man] will have to find the subcontractor?

It is the reverse of these methods which must be followed if there is to be any hope of achieving the President's huge arms goals this year. Instead of buying individual items, the government must *organize* industry for production; and instead of relying on the individual small business man to find himself a subcontractor of a subsubcontractor who is willing to give him a small piece of the arms job, production boards must break down the blueprint into bits and pieces and hand them out directly to small business.

From a long talk I had with Senator Truman, who understands the need for this approach to the problem, I gathered that Nelson himself was thinking in these terms. And Nelson indicated as much when he spoke of setting up a one-man boss for each industry to handle conversion. But here again, as in the WPB alias OPM itself, results cannot be obtained so long as the same type

of men, dollar-a-yearlings and army-navy bureaucrats, must be relied upon to carry out the orders. Nelson is likable, intelligent, and well-intentioned, but too trusting. Thus he has handed over Floyd Odlum's subcontracting duties to Harrison, who has the big business point of view, and he picked Edsel Ford's brother-in-law, Ernest Kanzler, as one-man boss of the automobile industry. In these two moves the business-as-usual crowd won precious victories. Odlum was a failure, but he had men around him who couldn't be trusted to keep orders away from little business. His powers are in "safe" hands now. The Kanzler appointment means that the automobile industry will be able to handle conversion in its own way in its own time and eliminates the "danger" of labor participation in management. Yet the secret of reforming the arms effort lies in bringing labor and small business into full participation in the work of production boards in every area and every industry. It will not be reformed by changing one dollar-a-year man for another. Nelson hasn't even changed the dollar-a-year men.

Our Debt to the Dutch

BY HALLETT ABEND

ON FEBRUARY 2, 1940, a diplomatic conflict began between Japan and Holland which was of utmost importance to the United States. On that date Japan made its first move toward demanding special trade privileges in the Netherlands East Indies, and for more than sixteen months thereafter kept applying pressure against the Dutch authorities for greatly increased supplies of rubber, tin, and oil. The Dutch suspected that Japan wanted these vital materials to facilitate further conquest in the Far East and to reship to Germany. The Dutch said that existing economic relations could continue, that Japan could purchase as great a proportion of the products of the East Indies as it had averaged during the preceding five years. Japan was not satisfied and kept pressing for further concessions, and the Japanese press began to publish editorials about the "manifest destiny" of the empire beckoning from the south. When, last June, the pressure was relaxed and Japan met diplomatic defeat with pretended good grace, the Dutch felt certain that the next step would be war. In six months their forebodings were realized. But they had won precious time for us as well as for themselves.

The High Commands of the United States army and navy blanch now when they consider how doubly desperate the situation would be today in the Far East if the Dutch had yielded to Japan's threats in June of last year. There would have been Japanese planes on all their land-

ing fields on December 7, and Japanese ships in all their harbors. Thousands of Japanese reservists, disguised as laborers, traders, or fishermen, would have infiltrated into the islands between June and December and would have smuggled in ammunition. British North Borneo offers an example of what would have happened on Java, for there 2,000 supposedly Japanese fishermen suddenly appeared, clad in the uniforms of military police and heavily armed. The Japanese would have been able to seize the oil wells, tin mines, and power plants before they could have been destroyed. Soerabaja would have been made useless as a base for the united navies under Admiral Thomas C. Hart, and the route from Australia to Singapore would have been closed the first week of the war.

Instead of yielding, the East Indies prepared their defenses feverishly and therefore were far from powerless when December 7 arrived. Their fleet had been at sea, prepared for war, for eight days. Within three weeks their submarines and planes sank more than a score of Japanese troop transports and destroyers off the coasts of Luzon and the Malay Peninsula.

During the period of negotiation the East Indies were in no position to fight, and it devolved upon two stout-hearted, wise, and patient men to play a masterly game. Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies,

and Dr. Hubertus Johannes van Mook were playing perilously for time against a wily, greedy, and impatient foe. Every week was precious, for every week their preparedness program advanced farther.

His Excellency Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer is descended from a long line of Dutch aristocrats, and before the war was one of the largest landowners in Holland. For generations his forefathers have held positions of trust at court, and have had in large part custody of the fortunes of the ruling house. At one time he was on the staff of the Netherlands legation at Washington, and his wife is of a wealthy Baltimore family.

H. J. van Mook, by contrast, is the son of two Amsterdam school teachers. He was born in Semarang, Java, obtained his early education in the Indies, and then studied in Holland. He began his career as an assistant in the police department of Batavia. Later he was appointed to a seat in the Volksraad, or Parliament of the East Indies, and as late as 1934 was editor of a radical bi-weekly called *De Stuw*. He was in the United States in 1936 as the chief delegate from the East Indies to the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The demands which the Japanese government made upon these two men are amazing in their effrontery. Here they are, published in full for the first time: (1) the right of unrestricted immigration to the East Indies for all Japanese; (2) the concession for a cable, Japanese owned and operated, to run from the island of Yap to Batavia; (3) unrestricted fishing rights for Japanese among the islands of the Netherlands East Indies, which cover an area as large as the continental United States; (4) unrestricted rights to operate coastal shipping lines between ports of the East Indies; (5) unrestricted rights to operate air lines between the islands of the East Indies and to have branch lines to Japanese lands and possessions, also the right to acquire air fields; (6) unrestricted rights to explore the islands and to develop mineral and oil resources; (7) definite pledges to allot to Japan large percentages of East Indies exports of rubber, tin, oil, quinine, and other supplies vital in time of war, taking in payment large imports of Japanese factory products; (8) the establishment of jointly owned and managed industrial enterprises, docks, warehouses, and hydroelectric developments.

These are the terms of an arrogant conqueror. They were coupled with threats of direct action to bring about the fulfilment of Japan's "divine mission in East Asia" if they were rejected. Except that they did not include provisions for Japanese naval, military, and financial "advisers," they were strangely reminiscent of the outrageous demands which Japan made upon China in 1915—the infamous secret Twenty-one Demands.

The situation for the Dutch was almost desperate. The collapse of their government in Holland and Britain's exposed position after Dunkirk left Batavia no alterna-

tive but to temporize. At Bandoeng, the army headquarters in Java, were 750 heavy machine-guns—but no ammunition. Near Batavia were 20 tanks. There were trained crews to operate 400 tanks, but Britain had to keep all it could make, and we were turning out almost none in 1940. The Dutch were short of rifles, had an inadequate supply of munitions, and were pleading with Washington for bombers and pursuit planes.

Late in August of 1940 Japan appointed its Minister of Commerce and Industry, I. Kobayashi, head of a special delegation to the East Indies. The mission arrived in Batavia on September 12, and except for a few economic experts, was made up of army and navy men. "Evidently they expected to move right in," the Governor General told me.

A fortnight after the Kobayashi mission reached Batavia came the formal announcement that Japan had become a full ally of Germany and Italy. When negotiations got under way, the only important demand which Kobayashi insisted should be granted immediately was for a greatly increased supply of oil and gasoline from Borneo and Sumatra.

Van Mook prepared a caustic reply declaring that the East Indies government was not running an international filling station. The Governor General toned the wording down to a polite reminder to Japan that the government owned no oil wells but permitted certain companies to produce oil under concessions. The baffled Japanese found they would have to deal with American- and British-owned producing companies, and these corporations said, with politely regretful phrases, that most of their output was already contracted for long ahead.

Kobayashi liked heavy luncheons. He liked plenty of hot rice wine with his meals. Often he would go sound asleep during the talks and even snore. Loudly. Then, he would awaken with a jerk, pound the conference table with his fist, and make outrageous and insulting threats. The Japanese delegates were often aghast. More than once they asked their Netherlands hosts to expunge records of Kobayashi's awakening remarks from the official minutes of the meetings. Outwitted and sweating, Kobayashi returned to Japan on October 22.

Kenkichi Yoshizawa, an experienced diplomat, succeeded Kobayashi. Yoshizawa started out briskly enough. Arriving at Batavia three days after Christmas, 1940, he declared he was "the last of the negotiators."

The Dutch had to keep in mind that any sharp move might precipitate a Japanese attack, and the United States and Great Britain were then in no position to give the East Indies adequate aid. So they dragged the negotiations along.

On May 22, 1941, the Japanese presented a "final" written memorandum covering their "minimum" demands. The Dutch made a "final" written reply on June 6. Then came a lull of ten days, after which Yoshizawa

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made a formal demand for a final personal hearing by the Governor General himself. Van Mook replied that His Excellency was not a negotiator but the ruler, by proxy, for the Queen. Finally it was agreed that this "final" meeting was to be technically between the van Mook and Yoshizawa groups, but that it would be in the presence of the Governor General.

Yoshizawa was brief, but he practically delivered an ultimatum. Van Mook also was brief—his speech was a heated and utter rejection of the Japanese demands. Then the Governor General diplomatically took up the Japanese demands and point by point rejected them.

It would not be right to hamper the development of valuable elements of the population by being too liberal in the admittance of foreign workers and foreign interests, he said. Moreover, it had become a traditional policy with the Netherlands government to show no discrimination against any friendly power, and privileges granted to one must be granted to all. The Indies had reached such a stage of domestic development that further assistance was not needed, except from the mother country.

The amount of business to be done would not justify a new cable to Japan. Radio and wireless in the islands were efficient and adequate for all needs, coastal shipping was adequate, and the air lines had been "amply developed by Netherlands enterprises." As to air lines, he added, being sweetly reasonable, the Netherlands would consider proposals for reciprocal agreements—well knowing the Japanese would not permit Dutch-controlled lines to land planes on Japanese territory.

Yoshizawa was stunned. He looked around at the expressionless faces of the members of his own delegation. Then the "last negotiator" backed down. He said to the assemblage that he was sorry to have failed in a great mission for the first time in his life. He bore no ill-will, he said, and as a gesture of amity he would then and there buy 100,000 tons of the sugar the Dutch had been unable to sell. So ended the great saber-rattling bluff—in a sugar deal. To this day officials in Batavia are puzzled by Yoshizawa's backdown. His government must have approved in advance; must have had its reasons, as yet inscrutable.



IT'S A LIE! WE'RE NOT RETREATING—JUST ADVANCING BACKWARDS

"They could have conquered us with ease in 1940," said the Governor General the last time I saw him. "They thought they could come at any time and have us as dessert, after a full meal in Indo-China and Thailand. But they waited too long. Now we are ready to fight, not talk."

Allied losses in the Far Pacific have been so serious that today we distil cold comfort by recalling that Japan's victories have cost it very dear. Had the Dutch given Japan the demanded concessions in the East Indies, those victories would have been attained at less than half their subsequent cost. Such cheap victories would have greatly prolonged the war, and would have made the difficulty of our ultimate triumph much greater.

"Those funny Japanese and their funny ideas," van Mook said to me on one of my last evenings in Batavia. "They threatened us, actually told us that we *must* join their so-called co-prosperity sphere. Later, they said, the United States would be forced to join, and then America, Japan, and Holland would rule the world. They dis-

missed Britain and Germany from their calculations for the future, saying that both would be exhausted and utterly powerless after the war."

The Governor General's last words were of a different tenor. We had sat silent for a time after a long talk. Then, across the wide lawns, from the distant and dusty street came a clanking rumble to break the peace of the great palace. We rose together and walked to one of the windows. Down the road rolled a long line of field artillery, trucks, small armored cars.

"Look at that spectacle," His Excellency exclaimed. "This country's total resources and savings are being spent on guns, ships, planes, bombs, tanks. It will take a generation or more for these 70,000,000 people to amass again the wealth which we are spending now so willingly upon preparedness. And all because of Hitler's frenzy, Mussolini's vanity, and Japan's greed. We must all fight this evil thing together, and win such a victory, regardless of the cost, that it can never occur to mankind again."

Why Argentina Balked

BY HUGO FERNANDEZ ARTUCIO

THE beautiful ideal of continental solidarity has been torn to shreds at the conference at Rio de Janeiro to the open satisfaction of the Axis powers. This sinister task has been performed by Dr. Ruiz Guiñazú, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, fervent admirer of the Franco regime in Spain and public prophet of a totalitarian victory in the present war. As this article is being written, reports from the Brazilian capital clearly indicate that the Argentine government will stubbornly adhere to the dictum laid down by the president of the delegation just before the conference began: Argentina, he said, would oppose any interpretation of continental solidarity that might entail going to war against the Axis.

The position of Acting President Castillo is no less clear-cut; after the protracted struggle of the first week of the conference it must be evident to the most optimistic or gullible that even if some compromise formula is ultimately agreed to, the present Argentine government will never whole-heartedly cooperate with the rest of the hemisphere in a vigorous anti-Nazi policy. Whatever concessions Dr. Castillo may make in words, he cannot be expected to abandon, even under the strongest pressure, a policy which is part of a continuing, calculated political plan embracing the internal organization and control of Argentina as well as its relations with its neighbors and with the Axis powers.

Proceeding with deliberate and systematic steps, the Acting President has gradually suppressed all those civil rights through which the majority of the people of Argentina might express their profound feeling of solidarity with the United States and the anti-Axis cause in general. First, without any constitutional authority, he dissolved the municipal council of Buenos Aires, which served as an effective instrument of the popular will. Immediately after that he suspended the guaranties for the elections of December 7, opening the way for one of the most scandalous electoral frauds ever known in the Americas. Later, when the United States was treacherously attacked by Japan, Dr. Castillo prohibited the nation-wide pro-Ally organization, *Acción Argentina*, from holding the more than 2,000 meetings that it had called throughout the country to express the sympathy and support of the people of Argentina for their northern neighbor. As a finishing touch, the Acting President shed his last pretense of democracy by prohibiting a unique meeting in honor of President Roosevelt, convoked not by representatives of the boisterous and agitated public but by the most conservative personalities of the democratic Argentine bourgeoisie, such men as the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Julio A. Rocca, and the Nobel peace-prize winner, Dr. Saavedra Lamas.

It was to effect these repressions that Castillo declared

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the state of siege which was hypocritically justified as a measure taken to insure Argentina's strict adherence to its obligations under the Havana convention.

What brought about the present desperate situation in that country of the south whose intellectual and material development has constituted one of the miracles of this century? Foreign agents have succeeded in deeply dividing public opinion. Grave symptoms of totalitarian penetration have appeared in the military establishment of the country. Relations between capital and labor grow more tense and acrimonious day by day. The various foreign colonies which are dotted over the vast areas of the republic have developed a dangerous consciousness of being national minorities. A wave of crass materialism has spread through many sectors of the people. Men of good-will cannot find common ground on which to unite in the work of national salvation. The political situation, completing this unhappy picture, is vividly described by Américo Ghioldi, leader of the opposition in the House of Deputies, in a letter to the writer sent from Buenos Aires on January 14. Mr. Ghioldi writes:

I now write you my impressions regarding our political situation. I cannot tell you anything encouraging about the present or the immediate future. A government which has no public support is maintaining itself in power in order to carry out within the country a frankly anti-democratic task and externally a confused and complex policy that threatens to leave Argentina completely isolated in the continent and viewed with ill-feeling by the other countries, which up to a few years ago had granted her most-favored-nation treatment. The state of siege smothers public opinion, paralyzes the press, inhibits the action of the political parties, and finally suppresses all expression of the thought and the conscience of the citizens.

Since the elections of December 7 the people have fallen into a state of obvious depression due to the nausea produced by the frauds and to disappointment at the weakness and lack of action of the majority party. Acción Argentina is restrained and neutralized by the government, thanks to the weapons of coercion which the state of siege has placed in its hands. The newspapers, just as if they existed under a terror, inform us of nothing and do not even hint at the most minor detail. The political parties have been silenced. Our party is the only one that has called a national assembly of delegates to consider the internal situation of the country; but it had to be suspended on the second day of its deliberations under pressure from the police. Nevertheless, we were able to draw up and sign a manifesto which we distributed at first clandestinely and then published in *La Vanguardia* yesterday. This resulted in an order closing down our newspaper for a period of five days, and we must expect other sanctions in response to future acts which we may feel obliged to take. As you see, our situation could not be more unpleasant.

The existence in Argentina of a masked political plot with international ramifications was exposed at a memorable session of the Argentine Congress by Deputy Ghioldi. There have always been people in Argentina willing to create a government on the totalitarian model



Acting President Castillo

without recourse to the ballot box. This particular plan was drawn up by the darkest forces in Argentina—leaders of the landowning oligarchy which regained control of the government at the time of the revolution of September, 1930, led by General Uriburu. Some of these leaders would willingly avail themselves of foreign help, even if it meant the enslavement of the country,

so long as they themselves could retain the power which they seized in defiance of the political wishes of the mass of the people.

This oligarchic element controlled the destinies of the Argentine republic until the beginning of this century. Then the Conservative Party, today called the National Democratic Party, was swept out of power by democratic forces which had been tremendously strengthened by the heavy inflow of immigrants from Europe. This change opened enormous possibilities for the democratic development of Argentina. But the landowning oligarchy also owned the other principal sources of national wealth, and although it had suffered a political defeat it was far from vanquished. It had to wait fifteen years, but the hour of its revenge arrived when the second administration of Hipólito Irigoyen, the hypnotic *caudillo* of the Radical Party, became honeycombed with corruption and the party itself began to decay.

The wealthy landowners have controlled the government ever since, retaining power by violence, fraud, and corruption, increased or decreased from time to time as circumstances have dictated. Today this control is maintained through an alliance with the agents of foreign invasion and the most reactionary forces of Argentina—those forces which keep green the memory of the tyrant Rosas and talk a great deal about the "restoration." They use a system of propaganda that borders closely on the technique of the war of nerves. They know well the political function of fear. A great deal of what is now happening in Argentina is the result of this war of

nerves. To speak perfectly plainly, those who are carrying on the war of nerves are the same men who control the government and are working to defeat democracy.

The foregoing statement can and must be applied to Acting President Castillo. On more than one occasion it has been pointed out that he either did not wish or did not know how to curb certain evident symptoms of national decomposition, and he has paid no attention to the proved facts of totalitarian penetration. The newspapers, the political parties, and the labor organizations have denounced the guilty tolerance of the executive toward the election frauds. The Acting President, however, each day moves farther away from the people.

The existence of the dangers here described is unquestionable, but equally unquestionable is the existence, though so far rather vague and hidden, of a deep sentiment in favor of the restoration of those basic principles of democracy which were laid down by the founders of the Argentine nation. That sentiment, crystallized into a powerful political force, is the weapon that must be used by those who have the responsibility of defending the hemisphere.

Until now the grand strategy required for the defense of South America has been developed only in the military and economic fields. Little or nothing has been done to plan political warfare, for which the chief instrument must be public opinion freed and transformed into a fighting expression of the democratic beliefs of the people. From the body of public opinion can be drawn the militant and disciplined regulars to form "com-mando" squads in the army of democracy.

If this lesson had been learned in time and the Argentine people had been aided by the forces directing this great battle for democracy, yesterday in Rio de Janeiro, today in Buenos Aires, the fifth-column government of Dr. Castillo would no longer exist as the advance guard of an army of invasion against the shores of America.

"Buoyant, Gladdy and Funny . . . Ought to make everyone very happy."
—Atkinson, Times

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A New Comedy by Jerome Chodorov and Joseph Fields
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Evenings, 8:40; Matinees, WEDNESDAY & SATURDAY, 2:40

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EMPIRE, B'way & 40 St. — 269 seats \$1.10
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In the Wind

A REPRESENTATIVE from an Eastern state recently wrote to the Library of Congress asking if it could supply him information concerning the whereabouts of the underground railway that connected the North and South during the Civil War. He was, he said, planning to submit to Congress a proposal that it be shored up and used for air-raid shelters.

LEON TROTSKY'S biography of Stalin, which was withdrawn from circulation by Harper's because the firm felt it an inauspicious moment to publish such a book, has become a real collector's item. The decision not to sell the book was only made after copies had gone out to reviewers. Harper's asked all persons who had copies to return them; the few who did not comply could now get as much as \$100 for their copies.

AT ITS RECENT CONVENTION the Associated Farmers, California employers' organization, was informed by its chief lobbyist that not a single one of the 426 bills which it had opposed in 1941 ever reached the Governor's desk.

FROM THE SOCIETY COLUMN of the London *Daily Express*: "Mrs. Bunce went to make bombs—small pretty bombs, turned and shaped by her gentle, domesticated hands."

A GROUP OF SHORT-WAVE radio listeners recently compiled some statistics on German broadcasts. They discovered among other things, that during 1941 Martin Dies, Hamilton Fish, and Gerald P. Nye led all other Americans in favorable mentions over the Berlin radio.

AUTRE TEMPS: In a recent editorial on defense production, the *Daily Worker* said: "The employers have a right to reasonable profits; have a right to manage their own plants; have a right to make contributions to the war program out of their own experience; have a right to press their point of view."

REPORTING ON HIS EXPENSES in running the Georgia Executive Mansion, Eugene Talmadge listed his servants as follows: "One maid, one cook, one butler, and one chauffeur, at a total cost of \$50 per week."

A GERMAN REFUGEE who broadcasts anti-Axis speeches to Europe made a curious complaint against the restrictions on "enemy aliens." "I speak to Germany over the short-wave radio," he said, "but I am not allowed to own a short-wave receiving set, and so my wife is not even permitted to hear her husband talk."

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Too Much Travel and Talk?

THE porter jerked the mattress of my berth. We would be getting in in twenty minutes, he said. It was dark as pitch outside the window. The occasional lights did not seem to break the great natural American blackout of the winter darkness before dawn. I got up sleepy and waited in the cold corridor to get off the train as it stopped briefly in the small city. And while I waited, boys began to go by—husky, good-looking boys going before daybreak, to the diner, which would have to work hard to feed them all before their cars would be switched off on the way to the naval training station. They looked in their civilian clothes very much like the boys in khaki who on their way back from furlough had crowded the day coaches on the way South.

"The government's traveling," said the conductor. He pocketed the government transportation request which I handed to him. "We get more of this than tickets or money."

That ought to be good news to persons disturbed by the immense huddling of government on the shores of the Potomac. It should please anybody who is alarmed by the fact that if the American population had grown at the same rate as the employees in the capital, the number of Americans would today approximate eight billion. Travel means that the government is spreading out into other parts of the country, which is where government ought to be. But I've talked to this traveling government. I have been a little part of it. Like thousands of others I've traveled thousands of miles to listen to an incalculable amount of talk by people who left their work to talk. And I know I am not the only American who is beginning to wonder whether there does not exist a confusion between conferences and accomplishments which needs to be examined.

Obviously not as many conferences are held in Washington as protective secretaries at officials' doors report. Being "in conference" may be a form of protective coloration which allows a man to do a lot of work. But conferring does go on endlessly all the same, and not alone where men just have to cross the street or the hall to confer. Americans are crossing rivers and mountain ranges, states, even the continent, to confer. That some of the conferences are productive no sensible man can doubt. It is also indisputable that a lot of men busy on indispensable jobs are everywhere moving as steadily as

the trains, the air lines, and the automobiles to sit in cigarette smoke and listen to men say what they have said before, time and again.

Of course, there are advantages to the transaction of business face to face. Wise decisions depend upon the meeting of many minds, and the meeting of the minds may be easier if the faces before them meet also. Long before government got big I knew about a railroad executive who did not like to commit himself on paper. They told the story about him that one morning he got a long letter. He read it, put on his hat, got on the train, rode five hundred miles. He walked into the office of his correspondent.

"No," he said. Then he turned around and made the trip back home.

I'm not suggesting that there is any such traveling now in this government, which is definitely not afraid of paper work. But a man I know who has been criticized for not doing his local defense job well told me rather pathetically that he couldn't go to a conference in Atlanta, Georgia, because in the same week he had been also called to another in Chicago, Illinois. Both may have been useful conferences. Many conferences undoubtedly are extremely useful. But I keep recalling the recent conversation of some busy men who had gathered in a hotel room after a conference. They had just listened to a morale-building address by a former Exalted Ruler of the Elks now giving part of his time to the effort for victory. There was more weariness than morale in that hotel room.

The trains are crowded. Because of lack of Pullmans some of America's soldiers traveling long distances on this continent have had to sit upright all night long in old coaches. The hotels need not worry about the tourists if they can still count on the conferences. But the tire-wear caused by talk must be reaching serious proportions. I am not proposing any rigid rationing of conferences. But it is about time that somebody in government in America began to think about the diminishing returns in terms of action from what looks like increasing travel for talk's sake.

I know the conference is a good old democratic method. But I also know that this old democracy of the United States still depends on men staying on their jobs and using their own intelligence and initiative where they are. I wonder whether, if they were told less, they wouldn't have time to do more.

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

Mr. Davies's Revelations

I'VE been a little dazed by the reviews of "Mission to Moscow" by Joseph E. Davies (Simon and Schuster, \$3). The first one I read appeared when I had only 100 pages behind me and was already wondering whether I could possibly fight my way through the dreary thicket of Mr. Davies's prose, where hanging clauses beat about one's head, one's feet drag at every step in a tangle of second-growth clichés, social, political, and aesthetic, and no birds sing—not a single bird. I didn't see all the reviews, but all I did see made me feel as if I were reading the wrong book. They seemed to be talking about a fascinating volume of "revelations" about all those Soviet mysteries we have pondered over so long. The book I was reading was a mish-mash, unbelievably dull, of every opinion, left, right, and center, that has been expressed about Russia in the last ten years. With one important exception: on the Red Army Mr. Davies sticks to one story, that it was and is a highly efficient army. I'm delighted to give him credit for that.

For the rest, his book is a confused muddle of uncorrelated impressions which, like the Bible, might yield proof for any opinion about the matters he discusses. Take the Moscow trials. The impression has been assiduously fostered that he not only "explains" the trials but proves that Stalin's purges, as well as every other Soviet policy, have been completely justified by events. To be sure, in one of his most characteristic sentences, complete with hanging clause and an orphaned "and which," he does say that the defendants were guilty.

Viewed objectively, however, and based upon my experience in the trial of cases and the application of the tests of credibility which past experience had afforded me, I arrived at the reluctant conclusion that the state had established its case, at least to the extent of proving the existence of a widespread conspiracy and plot among the political leaders against the Soviet government, and which under their statutes established the crimes set forth in the indictment.

But who ever doubted that the purges were the result of some sort of conspiracy against Stalin? The great question was whether that conspiracy was a fascist plot hatched in Berlin or an attempt to overthrow Stalin designed by Old Bolsheviks for Old Bolshevik reasons. Or again:

All of these trials, purges, and liquidations, which seemed so violent at the time and shocked the world, are now quite clearly a part of a vigorous and determined effort of the Stalin government to protect itself from not only revolution from within but from attack from without.

Even Trotsky would have admitted that. And he would certainly have granted the truth of Mr. Davies's "revelation" that "Stalin's policy is that he must have peace for the development of the U. S. S. R., and to keep his own government securely in power." Mr. Davies assumes later on that the Russian generals were fifth columnists. He never proves it, for the simple reason that no one, as Mr. Davies himself makes clear, could possibly obtain any real evidence.

Joseph Barnes says that Mr. Davies's book "gives heart to embattled democrats." Did he read this complacent sentence on page 227: "The Spanish situation doesn't look so good, but it may be that Franco will settle the issue by conclusive military success speedily"? Or the astounding remarks about Germany on page 434: "The boggy that a war would entail communism in a defeated Germany and Central Europe is plain bunk. Germany would go Socialist or become a *sensible military autocracy*" (my italics)?

On the other hand I should be the last to deny that Mr. Davies is a firm believer in capitalist democracy. On numerous occasions he gives fervid, if illiterate, thanks that he is an American. He is even more eloquent and repetitious in stating his belief "in the instincts of human nature toward self-interest." "These are imbedded in the glandular, nervous, and physical organisms of men and are the resultant of the atavistic forces of centuries." Mr. Davies also believes that evolution is better than revolution.

Large sections of Mr. Davies's book are given over to reports on Soviet industry. But here again there are no "revelations." He asks the questions any tourist asks and gets the same answers, the same welter of statistics. But it is hardly news in 1942 that there is tremendous industrial activity in the Soviet Union. And when I came face to face with the following footnote on page 611 I thought for one happy second that Mr. Davies was satirizing his own "revelations":

One of the significant facts connected with totalitarians which I noted in Europe is the manner in which, and the degree to which, they give attention to the youth. "As a twig is bent, so grows the tree."

To those who have not read even newspaper accounts of Soviet Russia during the past ten years, Mr. Davies's book may come as a "revelation." His silly remark about Stalin, that "a child would like to sit in his lap and a dog would sidle up to him," and his general provincial wonder at the "Soviet experiment" will endear him to those who have taken up the ridiculous line that Stalin, having come over to the Allied side, now stands exonerated of all his crimes; and that the Red Army would not be fighting the way it is if the GPU had not conducted one of the cruelest man-hunts in history.

"Viewed objectively," as Mr. Davies would say, "Mission to Moscow" is the book of an American business man-lawyer-politician whose heart is in the right place but whose mind is a wilderness of clichés, many of them contradictory. His monumental illiteracy might be dismissed as irrelevant if his writing were not so accurate a reflection of his primitive mental processes.

I am in favor of giving all aid to Russia; I yield to no one in my admiration of the exploits of the Red Army. But I do not feel compelled, therefore, to admit either that Stalin is vindicated or that Joseph E. Davies has written an important or revealing book.

The State Department ran no risk in releasing these amorphous dispatches; but one wonders why Davies's disparaging

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remarks about Ambassador Dodd were permitted publication. They are unpleasant and gratuitous—not because they are critical but because the basis of the criticism is never revealed.

MARGARET MARSHALL

The "Southern Review"

THE winter issue of the *Southern Review*, just published, is a special number devoted entirely to William Butler Yeats—a comprehensive survey of his achievement by fifteen American and English critics. The second of a series of symposiums that was initiated in 1940 by the *Review's* centenary issue on Hardy, it would be a remarkable editorial accomplishment at any time, and gives further evidence of the position the *Southern Review* has maintained since its foundation seven years ago. In that time it has become the most distinguished literary and critical quarterly in America, one of the few of its rank in our history. Thus it comes with the force of a disaster to learn that the Louisiana State University, which has generously financed the *Review* since its inception, has felt obliged by the war to withdraw its subsidy, and that unless unforeseen arrangements are made, the coming April issue will be the last. It is particularly depressing that one of the first casualties of the war should be the most distinguished literary journal we have, and to see that among the first things a war tends to destroy are the very possessions and institutions it is presumably being fought to save.

Perhaps the most serious problem that taxes the citizens of a civilized nation in war time is their duty to distinguish between the sacrifices that give strength and the losses that weaken the spirit and intelligence of their cause. Comforts, privileges, luxuries, and profits must inevitably be surrendered, if only because they are usually symptoms of the deficiency in moral courage and foresight that brings wars about. But when traditions and liberties—cultural, religious, educational—begin to disappear, we know that something is being damaged, perhaps permanently destroyed, which it is never easy to repair and often impossible to regain. Recent history, especially in the enemy countries, has shown only too violently what happens when these reinforcements of a people are destroyed. The foremost living authors of England—Shaw, Eliot, Wells, and their equals—have just addressed a plea to the British government to increase the supply of paper for books and magazines lest the estate of literature decline to a condition "past praying for." *Horizon*, an English magazine of limited circulation and appeal, has recently been saved from extinction by the paper-rationing board through the pleas of American readers. The threatened suspension of the *Southern Review* is expressly an occasion for Americans to come to the rescue of a national institution which has done as much for the good estate of American literature and thought during the past decade as any other single agency.

In its seven years the *Review* has published the most consistently distinguished literary and social criticism of its time; it has permitted its authors a scope and freedom of discussion nowhere else surpassed, and not often elsewhere apparent. Despite its association with a regional literary movement, it has printed the work of writers of many shades

"Are We Not Now One?"



"If we are not fighting this war for the children, what then are we fighting for?"

J. B. PRIESTLEY,
Chairman, British Committee

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Mr. Churchill

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of critical and political sympathy, and it has corrected certain popular conceptions of the Southern activity in literature by placing that movement in the perspective of the larger thought of the country and by contrasting its claims with those of other elements in the national life. It has likewise, in every issue, balanced its critical departments with creative work in fiction and poetry by many of the finest talents now at work. Simply to state these services is to insist on their indispensable function. It may, in times like the present, take a special effort of mind and imagination to realize how imperative the kind of work the *Southern Review* has done is to the prosperity of our common intelligence, but no one who has followed the *Review* consistently, who has felt the sincerity and zeal of its editorship, and who has profited by the skill and intelligence of its contributors, can be in doubt of what that value is.

The current Yeats number treats that poet's work and activities from many angles, by critics of the caliber of Eliot, Burke, Blackmur, Tate, Matthiessen, Knights, and Ransom, but one argument appears in almost all the essays. Yeats was a poet who, in an age of almost unprecedented violence, distraction, and instability, was able to raise to universal recognition and power the critical spirit and intellectual vision upon which the perpetuation of any nation's sanity and prosperity depends. His achievement, in an age like ours and in a country like Ireland, gave dramatic force and moral impressiveness to his labors even beyond the technical and spiritual triumphs of his art. "He was," says Eliot, "one of those few whose history is the history of their own time, who are a part of the consciousness of an age which cannot be understood without them."

The *Southern Review* has won its rank as a journal in which a similar consciousness has been apparent and in whose pages a comparable understanding of our time and of the crucial problems it faces in the future may be read. It is the most distinguished literary achievement to come out of the South, the most valuable contribution the Louisiana State University has made to American literature and our critical well-being. But more than a regional asset, it forms a center of intelligent thought and purpose which the country at large, and its writers, cannot afford to lose. Everyone who takes the present and the future with the seriousness they demand will hope that the officers of the university at Baton Rouge will find a way to prevent the suspension of one of the strongest evidences that remain to us of a culture that is worth the fight and sacrifices that are being made to save it.

"Discography" Unlimited

A GUIDE TO RECORDED MUSIC. By Irving Kolodin. Doubleday, Doran and Company. \$3.

IF IT'S a pig, you still have to buy it in a poke, but if it's a record, the beams of innumerable minds light up your darkness even before you have dreamed of a purchase. A man is an ass who thinks of going into a shop and using his own ears, long or short, in selecting a disc. As Oscar Levant says on the front flap of Mr. Kolodin's "Guide to Recorded Music," after reading about the six versions of Brahms's Third Symphony he knew more about the records than if he

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had listened to them himself. Had the book come out a little earlier, one feels, Brahms himself would have dispensed with performance: he would have read himself into a mood of self-satisfaction out of the pages of Mr. Kolodin.

I mean not the slightest disrespect to this latest work of "discography" or its author. I merely stress our growing dependence on printed repertories for the making of our musical choices. It is a case of consumer's research over hill and dale. Our music lover having retired to the country with pencil and paper, he turns first to Mr. Darrell's "Encyclopedia of Recorded Music"—an extraordinary work of erudition from which he learns, for example, that the only thing available from Liszt's "Tasso" is a phrase for the bass clarinet. Parts of the Encyclopedia are now out of date, but it remains the official guide to the musical waxworks.

Next he consults B. H. Haggin—"The Book of the Symphony," with its brilliant elucidations and criticism of favorite works, lists of alternative recordings, and celluloid ruler for measuring, and so distinguishing, codas and bridges. Also by Haggin, two editions and one supplement of "Music on Records," which initiates the listener into the pleasures of buying records and carping and quarreling about music. The reader quarrels with Mr. Haggin, Mr. Haggin quarrels with conductors and companies, the composers have apparently quarreled with those not listed, and in the head of our customer the musical life of America has begun to stir.

Then comes David Hall, who offers a more inclusive feast than Mr. Haggin, with scraps of musical history thrown in free, and the whole set off by a sauce of genuine enthusiasm. Hall will mislead you about the way records are made, and there is something suspiciously Freudian about his confusion concerning the matrix, but persons whose judgment I respect say that I undervalue the many merits of his work. So I gladly withdraw some of my former strictures, confident that ultimately the Recording Angel will do us both justice.

We now return to Mr. Kolodin and his indispensable volume. From Palestrina to Prokofieff (alliteration his), it lists all the recordings of serious music to be found in American catalogues. The author, who has long been a record sampler and whose anthology, "The Critical Composer," confirms his judgment, undertakes to gauge three things—artistic, mechanical, and economic value. *Fff* no longer means very loud, it means "outstanding interpretation"; asterisks keep a tinge of impropriety, for they deal with reproduction; and only the dollar sign speaks for itself as usual. The order is alphabetical, and the binding will survive the fame of most of those listed within.

When one computes the number of composers, works, performers, duplicates, and sides that Mr. Kolodin has heard or overheard, one is appalled at the magnitude of his accomplishment. Were there not moments, one wonders, such that if the Blue Danube had cropped up as a fourth movement amid the Brahms Double Concerto, Mr. Kolodin would have noticed nothing wrong, save perhaps the sequence of numbers on the label or a marked difference in volume, with "the solo violin utterly inadequate"? But no. He continues infallible through 475 pages of small print designed to spare your ears, your pocket-book, or your aesthetic sense. Only the French language can complain of him for too often neglecting its accents and genders.

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Much of the time Mr. Kolodin manages to be witty as well as useful, from which I infer that he had an assistant for changing all those needles. We hear about the conductor who was there "merely to give the signal for starting," the modern composer who has produced "a witless, charming work," the performer who was "given poor support by the engineers." Mr. Kolodin can be more violent, but hardly ever when he passes judgment on the music itself, for he does this very rarely. His book therefore does not compete with Haggin's or Hall's, and it fills out the grand outline of Darrell's. So modest indeed are his prefatory claims that it is almost sure he would not want Oscar Levant's abdication of his own ears to become general. The pursuit of happiness in a stuffy booth with a set of Doppelganger's Inverted Fugue for Triangle will not be prosecuted as an act in restraint of trade, and what is perhaps more important, the record owner's delight in making the best of a bad set, in squeezing music out of an old one, and in adjusting his ears to the unevenness of a third, will remain as a necessary corrective to poor recording on the one hand and the possibly over-strict advice of our experts on the other.

JACQUES BARZUN

Churchill, Democratic Tory

MR. CHURCHILL. By Phillip Guedalla. Reynal and Hitchcock. \$3.

THE emergence of Mr. Churchill as the leader of the British people in the hour of their gravest crisis will undoubtedly become central to the drama of the history of this era. It is already quite certain that he will take a place in British history not incomparable to Lincoln's position in our history, and certainly comparable to Pitt's in his own country. Whatever may be the comparative achievements of Roosevelt and Churchill, nothing that Roosevelt can do or has done will have quite the dramatic effect of Churchill's assumption of power a few brief weeks before Dunkirk brought the mighty British Empire so close to complete disaster, and of his superb embodiment of the fortitude of the British people in this dark hour.

Of the many biographies of Churchill which are making their appearance, Guedalla's is the first, at least the first to be published here, which rises above journalism and gives us a full-length portrait of the man and some understanding of his springs of action. It is of course much too early to have a definitive portrait, not only because we lack the historical perspective but also because his own history and that of his tragic and heroic era has not yet been brought to completion. What is possible at this particular moment Guedalla has done, though the biography is hardly sufficiently critical to weigh his weaknesses as a statesman against his remarkable equipment as a commander of an embattled nation.

Many well-known facts in his history are thrown into a new or more vivid light. We are able to see how much he is the son of his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, not only in his peculiar brand of "democratic" torism—a debt to which he alluded in his recent address before our Congress—but also in the style of his oratory, which both the father and the son partly derived from the measured prose of Gibbon. His

intimate relation to Lloyd George through the long years of practically contemporaneous public service casts an interesting sidelight on his career, not widely perceived here.

Even if the climax of his career had not been made so impressive by history, the drama of his life would have engaged the interest of posterity. For here was a man who was in the British Cabinet at the age of thirty-three and First Lord of the Admiralty before he was forty; who went into eclipse after the débâcle of Gallipoli and never again achieved a fully commanding position, despite his virtuosity in Parliament, until he emerged as the leader of a nation which had disregarded his prophecies, scorned his advice, and turned for leadership to the vague and sentimental MacDonald and the unseeing and inert Baldwin. All this is told by Guedalla with a fine sense of its drama.

Churchill's greatness lies in his political realism, particularly in the field of foreign policy. He recognized the realities while his countrymen were content to sacrifice precious years to dreams of island security and of the possibility of beguiling Hitler with nice bourgeois bargains. The political realism which prompted him to proclaim solidarity with Russia on the day after Russia was invaded had long before persuaded him to insist on an alliance with Russia, against the reluctance of other Tories who would have preferred to come to terms with Hitler at the expense of Russia.

Churchill is an imperialist who proves that "class interests," or at least the economic interests of a class, need not, though they usually do, determine the politics of a class. Considerations of the pride and prestige of empire weigh more with him than the cash considerations which the man from Birmingham regarded as paramount in politics. Churchill is, in other words, no "economic man"; and that is one reason why he could comprehend the danger of a man and movement which defied the typical bourgeois calculations of his contemporaries.

Guedalla hardly emphasizes sufficiently, if at all, that Churchill's eclipse between the two wars was due not merely to his unappreciated virtues but to the defects of those virtues. He approaches domestic, particularly economic, politics with very little understanding. His eye has been centered on the international scene. And Britain was engaged in vast domestic economic readjustments between the two wars without essential help from him, despite his "democratic" torism. Furthermore, his realism in foreign politics operates on the edge of cynicism, as is the case with most realists. The cynicism became particularly apparent in his attitude toward India. On the Indian question his present commanding position in British politics is of fateful negative consequence, preventing Britain from making an adventure in democracy demanded by all the exigencies of the present situation.

No one can deny the greatness of this man in battle. But his defects as a statesman are so obvious that one thinks of his possible contributions to the problems of post-war reconstruction, both economic and international, with apprehension. One can only hope that history will be kind both to him and to our generation by not permitting him to exploit a prestige gained in battle, and deservedly rising as high as that of any statesman in the modern world, in tasks for which he is not endowed.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

RECORDS

STOKOWSKI'S notion that a piece of music for piano is a mere sketch that is completed only when it is filled in with the sounds of an orchestra is not correct: Ravel's orchestral version of Mussorgsky's "Pictures at an Exhibition" is effective, but Mussorgsky's original piano version of these imaginative pieces is even more so. I discovered this from a performance by Frank Sheridan a few years ago; but the effectiveness of Mussorgsky's writing is lessened by the affected phrasing and erratic tempos of Brailovsky's performance in the set (861, \$4.50) now issued by Victor; and so until a better piano performance is recorded I would choose Koussevitzky's set of the Ravel version.

Artur Schnabel's playing in Beethoven's Piano Sonata Op. 81a ("Les Adieux") (Set 858, \$2.50) is sensitive and fine-sounding, but some of the phrases acquire contours a little like those which Schnabel gives to phrases of Chopin; and with these contours lose the masculine strength that is characteristic of Beethoven. Sides 3 and 4 of my copy have noisily defective surfaces.

The usual beautiful sound of Heifetz's playing, the unusual simplicity of his phrasing, and his more moderate pace make the new Heifetz-Bay performance of the first movement of Brahms's Sonata Op. 100 (Set 856, \$3) better than the older Busch-Serkin performance; but in the second movement Heifetz reverts to his normal phrasing that is one excessive swell after another, whereas Busch plays with the tranquility that Brahms prescribes; and Busch and Serkin play with more of the grace that Brahms asks for in the third movement. If, then, I were going to acquire the work I would choose the Busch-Serkin version; but I would not acquire the work. Nor do I find Fauré's Sonata Op. 13 interesting; but if I did I would choose the appropriately—and surprisingly—suave Heifetz-Bay performance in preference to the new Elman-Mittman version (Set 859, \$3.50).

The music of Dawn and the Rhine-Journey from Wagner's "Götterdämmerung" that Toscanini recorded with the New York Philharmonic in 1936 he has recorded again with the N.B.C. Symphony (Set 853, \$3.50). At once, as throughout, one is struck by the increased brightness and liveness of the sounds on the new records; but in one respect the new recording is inferior to the old: with the brightness and liveness

on top there is not enough body down below—something that is most noticeable in the fortissimos of the full orchestra, which do not have the depth and massiveness of those on the old records. This performance takes three sides of the set; and the remaining three give us the first recording of Toscanini's magnificent performance of the music of Siegfried's Death. I must add that while I am impressed by the performances I dislike the music. And that the fourth side of my review set—the first side of the Siegfried's Death music—wavers badly in pitch.

Music that I like—the first-act duet, the Willow Song, and the Ave Maria from Verdi's "Otello"—is beautifully sung in German by Tiana Lemnitz and Torsten Ralf with a fine orchestral accompaniment by the Berlin State Opera Orchestra under Seidler-Winkler (Set 860, \$2.50). I hope that Rethberg's old record of the Willow Song and Ave Maria will be retained in the catalogue; for she sings them as beautifully, and in Italian. Sides 2 and 4 of my copy of the new set are noisily defective.

On single discs are Beethoven's "Ade-laide," not one of his best achievements, but admirably sung by Bjoerling (2195, \$.75); three inconsequential German Dances K. 605 of Mozart, well played by the Vienna Philharmonic under Walter (4564, \$.75); and the waltz from Tchaikovsky's "Eugene Onegin," not very engaging as played by Fiedler with the Boston "Pops" Orchestra, and brashly recorded (4565, \$.75).

B. H. HAGGIN

Latin American Records

AT LAST—for three weeks at least—the small but rapidly growing number of New Yorkers who enjoy authentic Latin American popular music can buy it easily and take it home with them to play on their own phonographs. And many more so far untouched will be exposed to its richness and variety. At the music booth at Macy's Latin American Fair a careful selection of records has been assembled for sale which includes characteristic songs and dances of all the leading countries to the south—music recorded in each by their own singers and performers.

For some reason—probably some absurd suspicion that it won't eventually pay out—the big record companies have done little or nothing to sell their South American wares in the United States. For example, almost all the Victor records made in Argentina, Brazil, or

Chile can be bought in the United States only by importation; and the discs recorded in the northern countries of Latin America, manufactured in Camden, New Jersey, for sale in those countries, are not stocked by dealers generally in the United States and so have to be specially ordered from Camden.

But at Macy's Fair you can step up to the record counter and get an Argentine *ranchera*, a Bolivian *bailecito*, a Chilean *tonada*, or a *sanjuanito* from the Ecuadorian Sierra. And in case you don't know one from another, there are annotated lists which will give you some idea of what would interest you most.

If you want to hear the *tango* as it is played in Buenos Aires, I suggest "Si no me engañas corazón" on Victor 38712—sophisticated, virile, and sentimental all at once, like the Argentinians themselves. For the rhythmic melancholy of the Incan highlands of Peru get the *huaiño* "Achachan," Victor 30047. The *cueca* "Apprendan la cueca" on Victor 53013 is truly Chilean and very different—heartily jolly and noisy. Those who like their Cuban music straight rather than with the sugared synthetics of Broadway should get "Para Vigo me voy"—a *conga* as it is done in *comparsas* along the Prado—on Victor 32836. The Brazilian *samba* "Mama eu quero" on Decca 23131 is nostalgic of costumed carnival parades in Rio and the *joropo* "La Malicia llanera" on Columbia 5326 has all the lively strength of the plainsmen of Venezuela. For those who like primitive power I recommend the Panamanian *tamboreras* "Soy Morenita" on Victor 82928 and the Cuban *son-afro* "Bruca manigua" on Victor 82114—each one unlike the other. And those who have followed, or would like to follow, a *mariachi* band up the cobbled streets of a Mexican village will especially like "Mañanitas tapatías" on Victor 75271.

EVANS CLARK

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Letters to the Editors

Thomas on Bates on Russia

Dear Sirs: In your issue of January 17 Ralph Bates, writing on the subject *Need We Fear Russia?* has seen fit to refer to my position on Russia without stating it adequately or quite accurately and without telling his readers that his debate with me took place before America's complete involvement in war. Assuredly, therefore, I am entitled to space to make my position clear. It can best be set forth chronologically.

Beginning in August, 1939, I vigorously attacked Stalin for giving Hitler the green light which cleared the way for his aggressive campaigns in Europe. I denied that Stalin acted out of love for Hitler, but also I denied that the salvation of the U. S. S. R. against possible attack required partial alliance with Hitler. I said that in the light of Stalin's whole record, what he hoped for was a situation in which all his rivals would destroy one another; then at the right time he could step in with his fresh armies and put together a broken Europe or perhaps a broken world.

When Hitler, as usual breaking all his agreements, turned on Stalin—mark you, not Stalin on Hitler—I expressed my hope for Russian success in beating back the invader, but declared the question which of two dictators would be master over the larger part of Europe and Asia was not worth the lives of American boys. As time went on, it became more and more doubtful that Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt, in the event of complete victory, would have the military power or the ideological strength (consider, for instance, the complete inadequacy of the Charter of the Atlantic) permanently to reorganize Europe and Asia as against the U. S. S. R. pan-Slavism, and Stalin's other army, the international Communist movement. I gave reasons why I believed that it was likely, although not absolutely certain, that after a victorious war on the part of the United Nations, both China in Asia and Germany in Europe would go Communist. In most of Europe there would be no forces that could withstand the economic and military power of Communist Russia plus Communist Germany, to say nothing of the spread of communism in other lands, which spread would be easier because, with all its totalitarian faults, commu-

nism is at least free from the monstrous doctrine of a master race.

Since the war has become an inescapable fact for us, I have acknowledged publicly the necessity which our government is under to cooperate in good faith with the great nation against which Hitler's might appears to be breaking. I have acknowledged the reasonableness of Stalin's refusal to fight two wars at one time; but I have raised publicly the double question which no one has answered—namely, to what extent is the U. S. S. R. still permitting Japan to get invaluable stores of oil from its part of the island of Sakhalin, and what possible justification can there be for continuing that trade?

I have also said that no Anglo-American military alliance which may try to ignore the U. S. S. R. and other nations can succeed in rebuilding the world. Of course I want no future war between such an alliance and Russia, but neither do I want to continue this war indefinitely only to the end that Stalin may become lord over most of Europe and Asia. Stalin's regime may be modified by events, but I am not yet persuaded that because he said, "God bless Roosevelt," the dictator of the U. S. S. R. will become a democrat or return to Christianity by Easter—not even if Mr. Roosevelt should be able to send him more tanks than seems probable. I fear that the Russian type of totalitarianism will remain a bureaucratic state capitalism, undemocratic, ruthless, and Machiavellian. The magnificent courage of the Russian people in resisting invasion does not disprove this statement.

Mr. Bates has given some vague program of hope and effort for diminishing my fears. He certainly has not removed them. To me it seems absolutely essential that he and you and all of us who believe in democracy should demand more adequate war aims than the Charter of the Atlantic, and give to the German people trustworthy assurances that if they repudiate their dictator, they will not themselves be crushed and their nation divided. As an evidence of humanity, of concern for suffering, yes, and as a matter of high statesmanship, it would also be well for the British and American governments to invite more of the good-will of the peoples of Europe by a greater and more practical interest in the problems of hunger and

disease. Certainly more could be done than is being done to fight these enemies of mankind in Greece, France, and Spain, and possibly even in the occupied countries.

NORMAN THOMAS

New York, January 21

The Hull-Miquelon Affair

Dear Sirs: Congratulations on your stand with regard to our State Department and its attitude in the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair. Miss Kirchwey's article in the January 3 issue of *The Nation* was particularly heartening, giving evidence, as it does, of an uncompromising determination to demand the long-needed purge.

It is quite evident that Mr. Hull, whether or not he is the actual source of the appeasement activities issuing from the State Department, can no longer be considered competent to occupy the high office of Secretary of State. That he has permitted inexcusable irresponsibility again and again among the subordinates in his department is reason enough for his removal. I believe that if you can establish beyond doubt just who is responsible for the undemocratic attitude of the State Department, you should do this service to the American people.

Let me say that I am not unaware of the difficulties you face in editing a completely fearless journal in this day and age. But I am sure that I can go on admiring your courage in the future, as I have in the past. All power to you!

HELEN D. CARPENTER

Portage, Wis., January 12

Dear Sirs: As a reader of *The Nation* and one who is in sympathy with *The Nation's* objectives I want to express my regret at your editorial on the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair, and to repudiate as untrue your telegram to Vice-Admiral Emile Muselier, in which you assume to speak for all loyal Americans.

I deplore much that has been done and I wish that we would take a more direct line toward Vichy and the old Marshal, but I am willing to admit that I have only partial knowledge of very delicate matters. Emotion is fine and necessary, but it should not be given free rein, especially by responsible publicists.

ERNEST M. BENEDICT

Franklinville, N. J., January 9

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